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In the Supreme Court
of the State of lJtah

WILFRED A. ROGALSKI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7982

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The respondent fails to state whether he disagrees with
the Statement of Facts set forth in the Brief of Appellant.
Instead, he proceeds to make a number of inaccurate statements,
and also argumentative assertions unwarranted by the record.
The appellant will discuss some of the inaccuracies in statements
of respondent in reply to the points listed in the Brief of Respondent. The respondent avoids all reference to the admis-
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sions of the respondent and the undisputed facts which show
that plaintiff established no cause of action against defendant.
On page 2, in his Preliminary Statement, respondent states
that the case was "submitted to a jury with appropriate instructions as to the definition of a business visitor or invitee and the
duty of care owed to such a person." The instructions will
be searched in vain for any appropriate definition of a business
visitor or for any information as to the distinction between a
business visitor and a mere licensee and a trespasser.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT
Point I
RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT "THIS CASE WAS
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY - THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS A BUSINESS VISITOR AND THAT DEFENDANT
HAD VIOLATED THE DUTY OF CARE OWED TO
SUCH A PERSON."
Respondent states on page 9: "The question before this
Court, of course, is not whether the facts disclose negligent
conduct on the part of defendant, but only whether there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury could make a finding."
In other words, the respondent insists that the objective test
of negligence based upon the standard of the conduct of a
reasonable and prudent person, is inapplicable, and that the
subjective test of what jurors might conclude from conjectures
should be adopted. The cited case of Stickle v. Union Pacific
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Railroad Co., 251 P. 2d 867, 870, does not depart from the
rule of an objective standard that the evidence must be sufficient
to warrant reasonable and prudent men to find the defendant
guilty of negligence.
In arguing that there was evidence from which the
jury could find that Rogalski was a business visitor, respondent
studiously avoids the undisputed fact that the property of
defendant covers a large area, and that the portion of real
estate where plaintiff's employer was a business visitor was
not the part of the land where Drouby was a lessee nor a
part of the land of defendant where the injury occurred. The
evidence shows that plaintiff knew that the concrete slab and
the appurtenances were adjacent to and connected with the
maintenance shops. In an attempt to evade the basic facts,
plaintiff argues:
"The defendant urges upon this Court a very artificial and untenable conception of what constitutes a
business visitor. It is defendant's contention that the
plaintiff's status must be determined with a tape measure, based upon the number of feet the place he was
injured was from the point at which business was
actually transacted, or whether or not money was actually paid by the plaintiff (or his employer) to be
where he was, or whether or not he had been expressly
invited to enter the particular area in question . . . "
Inferentially, respondent argues that being a business
visitor on some property owned by defendant, the jury could
guess that Rogalski had an implied invitation to enter upon
any other property owned by defendant if there was no fence
nor. other formidable barricade. The argument of respondent
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might sound a little plausible if there were a case involving an
attractive nuisance and the injured party were a child of tender
years; but clearly in this case, defendant's customers did not
go to the place where the injury occurred, and the plaintiff
himself had seen the place from a distance almost daily without having ventured onto the platform prior to the day when
his employer instructed him to steam-dean the undercarriage
of his employer's truck (R. 12 5) .
The "implied invitation" theory is without evidentiary
foundation in this case. The appellant does not disagree with
the rule that an invitation might be implied, but an examination of the cited cases indicates that the implied invitation
arises · from the nature of the premises to which visitors
generally are induced to come. There was no implied invitation for the public or any customers to come onto the concrete
platform to wash or steam-dean the undercarriage of trucks
at the expense of the defendant. There was nothing about
the existence of the maintenance shop and the adjacent washing platform and adjacent caustic soda tarik which would
constitute an implied invitation to a reasonable and prudent
member of the general public or of truck owners generally,
to come onto that concrete platform to steam-dean their trucks
just because they happened to be purchasing petroleum products
on some other portion of the land owned by defendant.
Furthermore, the "implied invitation" theory is predicated
upo~ the concept that the owner of the premises has given a
standing invitation for the public or some class to come at any
time during business hours, by the very nature of the premises.
Although respondent implies by argument that Parley Drouby,
6
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the employer of respondent, claimed a right to go upon the concrete platform and use the washing facilities, the admissions of
Drouby negative such a claim. Drouby expressly admitted that
he had no right to be there (R. 87). Nor is there any evidence that the defendant acquiesced in the use of that platform
by Drouby, for he did not claim that he sought permission
of any company official when he did use it, and he admitted
that when he had asked any company official he had been refused permission (R. 86, 87, 92). He testified that when he wanted
to use the washing facilities he "usually checked with the
people in the maintenance to see if they were going to be
using it, or if I was going to be in anybody's way." He acknowledged the fact that he had no arrangements for going
onto the concrete slab or for using any of the facilities (R.
86-87).
The testimony. of Parley Drouby negatives the implied
invitation theory. He took the liberty of using the facilities,
not by invitation, but because he found it advantageous to
himself financially to do so, by washing his trucks at the
expense of the defendant. He did not get any express permission~ but he merely ascertained from some employee in the
maintemince department whether the platform was going to
be in use or if he would be in the way. At most, he could claim
to be a bare licensee, not a business visitor on that concrete
platform, and then only at the particular occasions when he
made the inquiry.
Respondent cites Martin .v. Jones, 253 P. 2d 359, for the
contention that even if Drouby was a trespasser on the day
in question, plaintiff could recover if defendant's employees
7
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knew of his presence and failed to warn him of danger. The
case is not applicable since the defendant did not know that
Drouby fas using the premises on the day in question. Nor
did Drouby claim that he took the trouble to find out if defendant's maintenance men would be using the washing
facilities (R. 87). Inasmuch as Droubay claimed that the practice had been for him to make inquiry of someone in defendant's
maintenance department to find out if the platform would be
in use or if he would be in anybody's way, it is obvious that
Droubay recognized the fact that he had no invitation to use
the premises; and that even if he claimed permission on the
particular occasions when he made inquiry, he knew he had
to make inquiry on each occasion when he sought to use the
platform. He never had the status of an invitee, and on the
particular occasions when he had previously used the facilities,
the most that he could have claimed, would have been permission; and that on the day in question, he produced no proof
that he attempted to obtain permission from anyone, so that
his status was not even that of a bare licensee, but that of a
trespasser.
Respondent's argument that the "jury could reasonably
have inferred from this 'customary practice' that this same
practice was followed on the day in question and that permission was expressly obtained," is patently absurd; for Droubay
did not claim he had obtained permission from anyone on
the day in question, and the jury could not properly infer that
he had permission which he did not claim he had obtained.
All he had previously done was to ascertain whether the
maintenance employees of defendant were going to use the
8
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platform or whther he would be in in anybody's way. Ascertaining that defendant would not be using the facilities on
December 30, 1951, for example, could not be construed as
permission to use the platform on January 18, 1952. Then
too, it is significant that plaintiff did not see any of defendant's
employees around, and Droubay likewise did not see them,
so there could be no basis for the claimed inference of express
permission or any permission at all.
The contention that Droubay had an implied invitation
to use the washing platform, because he was once an employee,
is specious. When he ceased to be an employee, his duties to
use the washing platform ceased. Those duties could not automatically be transferred into rights, as a former employee has
no implied rights to use the property of his former employer.
The statement that Droubay had been "specifically instructed by defendant's sales department that these trucks
should be kept clean," (R. 117) is a misstatement of the
record. The sales department merely told Droubay that the
trucks would look better if they were kept clean (R. 117). No
one connected with defendant told Droubay that he could
use the facilities of defendant to keep his tr~cks clean. All of
the written instruments refute the contention that defendant
imposed on Droubay the obligation to keep his trucks clean.
The representative of the sales department made a recommendation which was for the benefit of Droubay to assist him
in getting business. Droubay did not claim he had any rights
on the washing platform, as lessee or otherwise. The arguments -that it was to the benefit of defendant for Droubay
to use the washing platform are fat-fetched, since it was not
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·•
necessary for Droubay to use defendant's facilities in order
to clean the trucks. There were other facilities available to him.
All Droubay was interested in doing by using defendant's
platform was. to save money. The argument about washing
the trucks to keep the Phillips 66 insignia clean, could have
no bearing on this accident anyway, because the accident resulted not from any washing operation of the insignia, but
from stepping off the concrete platform as a result of lack of
visibility created by plaintiff himself while in the course of
steam-cleaning the under-carriage of the truck.
Likewise, the contention that Droubay was a lessee of
defendant's property (R. 84), is also irrelevant, for he did
not lease any of the property involved in the accident. The concrete platform was not an inducement for the lease, nor was
said property an appurtenance to the leasehold.
The argument of respondent proceeds upon the nakea
theory that the plaintiff was a business visitor at the place
where the accident occurred, when plaintiff himself showed
by his testimony that he was merely carrying out the instructions of his employer Droubay in a negligent manner.
The alleged negligence of the defendant.
The whole argument of respondent is predicated upon
the notion that plaintiff was a business yisitor at the place
where the accident occurred, because he was a business visitor
earlier that day on some other portion of the land owned by
defendant. The plaintiff had completed the loading of the
petroleum products. He went from the leasehold directly to
10
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the concrete platform. Now just what duties does respondent
claim appellant violated?
It is clear that the following answer to written interrogatories constitute the only claim of negligence:
"14. No warning signs, directions, or instructions provi~ed;

no cover over the vat; vat placed too close to steam cleaning equipment; no proper protection or barricades around vat
for person working in vicinity; insufficient visibility provided
when steam hose in use."
1. The claim that there were no warning signs. By quoting

from the Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 343, the
plaintiff must concede that even to a business visitor there
could be no liability if theowner of land does not know, or
by the exercise of reasonable care could not discover, the condition involving an unreasonable risk. There could be no risk
to any person who looked and acted as a reasonable and prudent person. The testimony of the plaintiff shows that he could
have seen the tank adjacent to the concrete platform except
for two things: ( 1) He did not look before he started to
use the steam equipment, and in fact paid no attention whatsoever, to any objects to his right. ( 2) After he began to use
the steam, he created a cloud which completely obscured his
vision by the manner in which he operated the steam. The lack
of warning signs could not have contributed to the accident
since the plaintiff never looked in the direction of the tank
before he started to use the steam, and after he started to
steam-dean, he obscured his own view to such an extent that
he could not see such a sign had one been there. Likewise,
11
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it would have been futile for the defendant to have given
any instructions as to the use of the tank, inasmuch as use
of the tank was not the cause of the accident, but blindly
stepping into it. If respondent refers to instructions as to the
existence of such tank, he could not possibly claim more than
mere warning signs, and as pointed out above, such signs
would have been useless in view of the reckless disposition of
the plaintiff on that occasion.
2. The claim there was no cover over the vat: The evidence is conclusive that said caustic soda tank had a lid which
was fastened by hinges. Plaintiff did. not observe when he
· drove onto the concrete ramp whether the lid was up or down
(R. 160). Droubay testified that the cover-lid of the tank was
down when not in use, as far as he was able to observe
(R. 77). There is no evidence whatsoever that when the
Droubay truck was parked on the platform the cover-lid was
up instead of down. There is no proof that the tank was in
use on the day of the accident, and there is no evidence that
any of the defendant's employees raised that cover lid. Droubay
did not observe whether the lid was up or down when they
came onto the platform (R. 114, 127, 160). Neither Droubay
nor plaintiff saw any employees of the defendant working in
that immediate vicinity on the day of the accident (R. 77,
108, 114, 172-173), so there is no evidence from which a
valid inference could be raised that any of the defendant's
employees lifted the cover-lid on January 18th. For anyone
to conclude that the cover lid was up at the time plaintiff
came onto the platform, would be mere conjecture. Further·
more, to conclude that one of defendant's employees must have
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neglected to dose down the lid on some previous day or to
have raised it on the day of the accident when it was not being
used by defendant, would be predicated on speculation which
likewise would not be characteristic of the thinking of a reasonable and prudent man.

3. The claim that the vat was too close to the steam-cleaning
equipment: On page 21 of his brief, respondent states that
the ramp is "barely wide enough for a truck of the type
involved to be parked thereon and still room for a man using
the steam cleaning equipment to walk around it (R. 102, 125,
15 5) ." The statement is a distortion of the record. The truck
was only 7 feet 1 inch in width. The platform is 1 inch less
than 14 feet in width, so there was a total of nearly 7 feet for
working space. Since the plaintiff claimed he parked the truck
about 3 feet from the east end of the platform, and that he
had no difficulty working around to that point, the argument
of the plaintiff amounts to a further indicatjon of negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, by parking the truck too close to
the edge of the concrete platform. Parley Droubay had previously washed trucks and he had also steam-cleaned the
undercarriage of trucks without difficulty. The fact is, that
plaintiff realized he had parked too close to the edge, and
that he had no room to work on the right side of the truck
without geting off the concrete platform at a place where he
knew there were "obstructions." The argument of respondent
merely indicates greater negligence on the part o~ plaintiff in
·failure to move the truck farther to the north so that he could
work on the concrete platform. The argument also emphasizes the negligence of the plaintiff in his indisposition to
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make any observations as to objects near or adjacent to the
platform.
As admitted by the plaintiff, the caustic soda tank was
entirely off the platform, 2 inches away, and extended 13
to 14 inches above the platform. Obviously, the platform and
the tank had to be in a position where defendant could use
the same. The same were clearly visible to all persons who
looked, and the only excuse for plaintiff not being able to see
the tank was his indisposition to look to see what could clearly
be seen.

4. The claim there was no barricade around the vat: Inasmuch as plaintiff for all practical purposes blind-folded himself so that he could not see where he was going, if there had
been a barricade around the tank, plaintiff might have suffered
a worse injury by running into such barricade or falling over
it head-first. A barricade of any substantial height would have
made it impossible to use the tank, and appellant submits that
no reasonable and prudent landowner can possibly forsee
what will happen to a person who ~ither shuts his eyes when
moving around, or blindfolds himself so he cannot see what
he is doing or where he is going.
5. The claim that there was insufficient visibility when
the steam hose was in use: Respondent states that "One operating the steam cleaning equipment, which is located on the
opposite side of the ramp than the vat, would normally be
unable, from that location, to see the vat because of the truck"
(Page 21). But the truck was not placed there by defendant,
but by the plaintiff. Defendant did nothing to obscure any
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one's view. Although respondent contends that Droubay himself did not see the tank on the day of the accident, Droubay
merely testified that he paid no attention to it (R. 74). Respondent further says: "The steam cleaning equipment, when
in operation, greatly affected the vision of one using it (R.
131) ." Such statement is not correct, for it depends on how
a person directs the steam. All a person needs to do in order
to see where he is going, while the steam is on, is to turn the
nozzle to one side, particularly up in the air (R. 165-170).
There was nothing defective about the concrete platform.
It was not slippery. The stumbling of plaintiff was due to lack
of visibility which he created himself. There was nothing wrong
with the steam-cleaning equipment, either. It was not shown
to be defective. The steam cloud of which plaintiff complains,
and the attendant lack of visibility, was not created by the·
defendant, but by plaintiff himself. He created that steam cloud
in his own path, and he recklessly proceeded into that cloud.
It would have been impossible for defendant to have created
visibility, when plaintiff willfully did everything conceivable
to blind himself and incapacitated himself from seeing where
he was going by the manner in which he operated the steam.
The defendant did not cause the plaintiff to step off the
concrete platform into the caustic soda tank. Defendant had
nothing to do with the movements or activities of plaintiff.
In fact, there is no proof that · defendant knew plaintiff was
even in the vicinity of the place where the injury occurred.
Nor is there any proof that defendant knew that someone had
raised the cover-lid to the caustic soda tank. Admittedly,
Droubay failed to inform plaintiff of the caustic soda tank;
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but no one representing defendant ditected plaintiff to either
go onto the platform or to step off the platform. By no possible stretch of the imagination could defendant be expected
to warn plaintiff when defendant did not know he was going
to be there, nor of a condition which it did not know existed
'
inasmuch as the practice was to keep the cover lid down
when the tank was not in use.
Plaintiff utterly failed to prove violation of any duty
of care by defendant. Defendant could not anticipate that anyone going onto the concrete platform, whether by permission
or without permission, would deliberately obscure his own
vision in disregard of his own safety; nor could defendant
anticipate that the cover-lid to the tank (which was then not
in use that day by defendant's employees), had been raised
by someone.

Point II.

RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT "PLAINTIFF WAS
NOT GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS
A MATTER OF LAW.''
It is interesting to note that respondent claims that proof
of contributory negligence must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to take a case from the jury.

In this case, the respondent himself furnished the proof
of his own neglect, and of his utter disregard for his own
safety, and he now claims that his own admissions should
be disregarded, to enable the jury to disbelieve his admissions
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and to permit him to recover because of his own negligence.
What respondent seems to contend is that the plaintiff having
been negligent, such negligence imposed upon the defendant
as owner of the premises a duty to rescue plaintiff from the
effects of his own negligence. It would appear that the "last
clear chance" doctrine is invoked by implication in a situation
to which in could have no possible application.
On page 27, respondent argues that the question is "what
a reasonable man steam cleaning his employe's truck on a
January day, with clouds of white steam being emitted from
the nozzle in his hands, would have done." The statement
begs the question, for a reasonable and prudent man would
not turn the nozzle to emit steam in the same direction as he
was moving, nor deliberately walk into a cloud of steam where
he could not see what he was doing nor where he was going.
Respondent argues that because Droubay paid no attention
to the caustic soda tank on the day in question, plaintiff could
not be expected to pay any attention either, which is another
way of saying that if one person does not act as a reasonable
and prudent man, no other person can be expected to do so,
and such indifference to safety cannot amount to contributory
negligence. Likewise, the contention that there were obstructions to the view of plaintiff, is also a misstatement of the
record, for the exhibits introduced by plaintiff dead y show that
plaintiffs views were not obstructed except by the obstructions
which he created himself.
Respondent argues on page 28 that the "jury in this case
found, and justly so, that it was not unreasonable for the
defendant to have proceeded around the truck as he did,
17
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operating the equipment and keeping his hip against the
fender of the truck. The fact that he could have moved the
nozzle does not mean that it was unreasonable for him not
to have done so. This was a question for the jury." Appellant
submits that no reasonable and prudent person would blindfold himself and move forward near the edge of a platform
near which were unknown objects. The evidence shows that
plaintiff knew how to make his path visible by merely turning
the nozzle to one side and waiting a moment for the steam to
disappear. The jury could not act as reasonable and prudent
men if they concluded that by blinding himself and moving forward blindly in an area of unknown objects, the
plaintiff was acting with due care for his own safety.
The respondent seems to urge a rule of law that the
more negligent a person becomes, the greater the duty of
care imposed upon the landowner by virtue of such negligence,
notwithstanding such negligent conduct is unknown to the
landowner.
The premises where plaintiff was working were not inherently dangerous. The only actual danger claimed was the
alleged lack of cover on the tank at the moment plaintiff stepped
over into it. If some unknown person had not raised that cover
lid, it is not certain whether or not plaintiff would have sus··
tained some injuries, since he was moving blindly into an
area which he had not observed. With the cover-lid down,
if he stumbl{!d, he might well have fallen against the stop
bar against which the cover-lid rests when the tank is open.
It was the conduct of plaintiff which was fraught with dangec
except for which no injury would have been sustained.
18
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Respondent cites a number of cases which hold that where
there is a conflict in the evidence from which reasonable
minds might differ as to whether the plaintiff was negligent,
the trial court may not take the case from the jury on motion
for directed verdict on the ground of contributory negligence.
Those cases are inapplicable, for in this case there is no
dispute in the evidence as to the conduct of plaintiff, and
there is no basis for reasonable minds to conclude that he
was not negligent. The answer to all of those cases is the
rule laid d0wn in Nabrotsky v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Co.,
103 Utah 274, 135 P. 2d 115, there the court held that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law when he was temporarily blinded by the glaring lights
of another car approaching from the opposite direction, but
proceeded onto the tracks and was injured by collision of
his car with an approaching train. This case presents a far
worse case of contributory negligence than the Nabrotsky
case, for in this case plaintiff was blinded by his own acts,
not the acts of a third party.

Point III.
THE CLAIM THAT "THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE."
The respondent does not state correctly the purpose of
the proffered evidence. The offer was not merely to "show
some inconsistency," but to introduce the admissions of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff was called upon not to repeat testimony
previously given at the trial, as contended by him in his brief,
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but to acknowledge the admissions made by him on deposition which show that he knew exactly how to.avoid obscuring
his view, by turning the steam nozzle away, and waiting mo~
mentarily ·for the steam cloud to clear away.
True, the plaintiff had already testified to facts which
showed that it was his own negligent conduct which prevented
him from seeing where he was going; but he had. predicated
his right of recovery, in part, at least upon ignorance, and the
proffered testimony demonstrated that he knew how to avoid
the condition, and that he could have avoided injury by looking where he was going and that he blinded himself wellknowing that he could have held the nozzle in a position
where he could have seen his surroundings.

Point IV.
THE CLAIM THAT "THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR IN REFUSING
TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS."
There is absolutely no substance to the contention that
defendant's requested instructions were substantially covered
in the charge to the jury. In the first place, the trial court did
not define or distinguish the term "business visitor" and left
the matter of definition to the conjecture of the jury. The
argument that defendant did not make a special plea that
plaintiff was either a bare licensee or a trespasser, and that
defendant merely denied that plaintiff was a business visitor,
assumes that defendant could not prove that plaintiff w;IS
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only a trespasser or at best a licensee under a denial that
plaintiff was a business visitor. Respondent states on page 43:
" ... As noted eariler in this brief, there may have
been sufficient evidence offered to support a finding
that plaintiff was a licensee or trespasser, . . . Even
assuming this, it is difficult to conceive how the defendant in this case could have been prejudiced by
the failure of the Court to so instruct."
There can be no doubt about the fact that plaintiff pleaded
that he was a business visitor and that he failed to prove any such
relationship as far as the premises where the accident occurred.
The court not only erred in denying the motion for directed
verdict, but the court refused to instruct the jury on defendant's
theory of the case. The court did not define "business visitor,"
and by refusing to give the requested instructions, the court
in effect ruled that if plaintiff was a business visitor on January
18th with respect to some portion of defendant's property,
then he was a business visitor with respect to all of the property
owned by defendant, irrespective of how remote the place
might have been from any place where business could possibly
be transacted.
In order for the court to have correctly charged the .jury
as to the meaning of the term "business visitor" to guide the
jury in determining whether or not he was a business invitee
at the place where the accident occurred, it was proper to
distinguish that term from "bare licensee" and "trespasser."
The cases cited by respondent where the defendant failed
to request the court to instruct as to the difference, have no
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application here, for the defendant specifically requested such
definitions and the court refused to give any such definitions.
.

.

.•f:;

The assertion that the instructions requested by defendant
did "not correctly state or apply the law," is contrary to the
record. In fact, plaintiff · does not take · the trouble
point
out wherein· any of ·the requests of ·defendant which the court
rejected, incorrectly states the law.

to

Respondent completely ignores the fact that the court refused to instruct the jury as to defendant's theory of the case.

Point V.
THE CLAIM THAT "THERE WAS NO DEFECT IN
PARTIES-THIS ACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY AND
BROUGHT IN BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND."
The claim is ·extravagant, for the letter from the State
Insurance Fund cannot be construed as an assignment of any
claims asserted by the State Insurance Fund, nor to constitute
the plaintiff a trustee. The defendant did not waive its ·objection
that the ~tate Insurance Fund was a necessary party in view
of its claim, notwithstanding said claim was unfounded. None
of the cases cited by respondent establish any law to the contrary.

. ' ' ~.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent cites a number of cases, none of which are
applicable to the facts of this case. Respondent predicated his
case upon the false premise that he was a business visitor
where the accident occurred, when his employer made no such
claim. Respondent made extravagant and untenable claims
of negligence; but the fact is that the premises were safe
where Droubay told plaintiff to work. Neither the concrete
platform nor the steam cleaning equipment was defective. The
only reason the accident occurred is that plaintiff for all practical purposes figuratively blindfolded himself by the manner
in which he operated the steam, and while blinded by his own
.negligent conduct, he stepped off the platform over into a
tank of caustic soda· which was plainly visible to any person
who would look. Notwithstanding the evidence of plaintiff's
negligence came from his own lips since none of defendant's employees or officials knew he was in the vicinity or
witnessed the accident, respondent contends that his own
undisputed evidence of reckless disregard for his own safety
could be viewed as acts of due care by reasonable and prudent
persons.
Appellant contends that the record compels a finding
that there was no negligence on the part of defendant, and
further that the record requires a finding upon the undisputed
testimony and admissions of plaintiff that his own egligence
was a proximate cause of the accident. Appellant further submits that not only did the trial court err in allowing the jury
to find defendant guilty of negligence, but that the court refused to furnish the jury any standards or guides, and the
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court refused to instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the
case, all of which warrants reversal of the judgment.
Respectfufly submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN & RICHARDS,
and PAUL E. REIMANN

Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant:
Received a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant,
this ________ c ___________ day of September, 1953.
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